Politics as gesture: Europe moves to fast track embrace of Ukraine

As Europe slides into its June-July summit round this week, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is driving the continent’s unifying institutions into their biggest reset since they absorbed central Europe following the collapse of the Soviet empire.

The leaders of the 27 states in the European Council this week are likely to begin the process of pushing the European Union borders about 1500km east of its current line in Lithuania when it recognises Ukraine (and Moldova) as candidates for EU membership.

Next week, in Madrid, the NATO summit is expected to follow on, dumping residual Cold War non-alignment on the continent when the alliance links up with Sweden and Finland.

The reset also looks like hurrying on long-stalled membership for the West Balkan states (as polite society now calls the former Yugoslavia plus Albania) into a sooner-rather-than-later framework.

When it faces big moments, Europe’s elites hide behind a “nothing to see here” conceit that acts to strip out politics, waving off controversy with a shrugging sense of inevitability.

In a combined one-two on Friday, the European Commission (the bureaucracy that runs the union) released its recommendation to grant both Ukraine and Moldova candidate status for EU membership. Visiting Kyiv, the political big three — German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, French President Emmanuel Macron and Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi — together with Romanian President Klaus Iohannis jumped on board, urging the political leadership in the European Council to endorse the recommendation.

Giving Ukraine candidate status would be, said Macron, “a strong, quick, expected gesture of hope and clarity that we want to send to Ukraine and its people”.

“Expected” carries the political weight. It’s the French equivalent of Thatcher’s “there is no alternative” politics, messaged directly to those few doubting countries (like Portugal, Sweden and Austria). Decisions of the Council — made up of the 27 heads of government of the member states — must be unanimous.

Other than the small Baltic states, the once-were Soviet republics have long been thought a bridge too far for “Europe”. When George Bush tried to push the process along through NATO, the traditional European powers nodded along in public, then killed it off in private.

Now, thanks to Putin’s invasion, the near-universal “no” has been suddenly normalised into all-but yes, with residual opposition left with one argument: “OK, but not yet”.

The “not yet” faction still has plenty to work with. The Commission’s recommendation comes with caveats: strong anti-corruption action and further democratic and constitutional reform.

Corruption is no small challenge. As one of the leading analysts of post-communist states, Bálint Magyar, says “the appropriation of public authority for private interests” in the de-communisation shocks of the 1990s resulted in oligarchic state capture, evolving into mafia states. Ukraine has been partially protected through the mix of public protest, civil society and oligarchic competition.

In central Europe, EU membership has been an imperfect device for eliminating corruption (*cough* Hungary), although, Magyar says, corruption is constrained both by the carrot of EU resources and the stick of EU institutions (for example, current EU threats to withdraw funding from Hungary over rule-of-law violations).

Candidate status is no guarantee of membership: there are five countries already waiting on transition — four of the West Balkan states, plus Turkey, which has been a “candidate” for over 30 years. In NATO, Turkey is threatening to blackball Sweden over its stand on Kurdish rights.

But recognising Ukraine as part of “Europe” is a big decision — it would mean shouting out, institutionally, Europe is now everything but Russia. It’s a big leap from the Western 12 that made up the Cold War-era common market. Ukraine will bring more people to the union’s labour market than the smallest dozen countries already in the EU.

Meanwhile, with Sweden and Finland joining NATO, the union and the alliance are increasingly aligned, with just four small EU countries (Ireland, Austria, Malta, Cyprus) and just one candidate (Serbia) sitting outside the military organisation.

Australia’s media tends to miss the big stories out of Europe as our global news comes almost exclusively through now-Brexit-ed London, where it’s reshaped by the UK’s particular concerns.

Add in the media’s domination by EU-hostile News Corp and the picture we’ve been getting is of a continent reeling from crisis to crisis: the 2008 financial bust, the Euro and austerity, the first Ukraine war in 2014, refugee influx, Brexit and Trump, pandemic and now renewal of the Ukraine war.

Yet, these rolling crises have driven a reimagining of Europe in both the union and the alliance — all the way through to a question that matters a lot to Australia: where do we fit in?