Like the US, Brazil remains badly divided, much of it still in the grip of the far right

The defeat of Jair Bolsonaro by Brazil’s former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva removes another corrupt, autocratic populist from power.

But as in the US, the circumstances suggest it could be merely a caesura for the extreme right in a country much of which remains controlled by Bolsonaro allies and supporters.

Lula’s margin in the presidential election was worryingly thin — 50.9% to 49.1% — in an economy with persistently high unemployment, high (albeit now declining) inflation, and staggering wealth inequality.

Much of the south of Brazil voted heavily for Bolsonaro, and a key Bolsanaro supporter, Tarcísio de Freitas, won the governorship of Sao Paulo comfortably — in fact, Bolsonaro supporters won more than half the state governorships. Worst of all, Bolsonaro’s party will be the biggest in the new Congress, meaning Lula will be unable to pass legislation without at least some backing from the right.

That result suggests Lula’s charisma, experience and political skills — and revulsion among many conservatives for Bolsonaro — were crucial to ousting the right-winger whose support remains widespread.

It also raises the same questions as the 2020 US presidential election: how can so many people still vote for a figure demonstrably unfit for leadership, a corrupt denialist whose failures led to, in the case of Brazil, 700,000 deaths from COVID? And how can such a figure retain such strong support within his own party?

Bolsonaro has repeatedly indicated, like Donald Trump, that an election result that does not mean his reelection will be a fraud, and has remained silent since his loss, although there are media reports that key supporters are not disputing the outcome.

That may reflect what has become clear from the fortunes of the Republican Party and Trump in the US — that his party will continue to wield power and he stands a good chance of returning to the presidency in 2026.

Bolsonaro might learn from the example of Trump and realise that his chances of returning to power will be increased by not engaging in the kind of treasonous undermining of democracy that has characterised Trump and his supporters since November 2020.

In the meantime, Bolsonaro’s party can block reform efforts by Lula’s administration while blaming the new president if the Brazilian economy fails to recover the once impressive rates of growth achieved under Lula previously.

As with Trump, it would be comforting to believe Bolsonaro is finished, but these profoundly unequal, profoundly divided polities are likely to remain a playground for populists for a long time to come.