‘Greater democracy’: China and Russia sketch out vision for a new world order

After Xi Jinping’s very ceremonious visit to his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in Moscow, Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister Qin Gang said: “The principal contradiction in today’s world is not at all a so-called democracy v autocracy played up by a handful of countries, but a struggle between development and containment of development, and between global justice and power politics.”

The visit was ostensibly about China’s latest attempt to broker peace in Ukraine, yet the end of Russia’s war was barely mentioned in various communiques from both sides, apart from Xi claiming China was “impartial”. Instead, China instead gave a clear signal that, with Russia as its partner, it wants to shape a new world order.

According to Qin, apparently it’s all about democracy: “China and Russia are committed to promoting a multipolar world and greater democracy in international relations, which meets the demand for upholding international equity and justice, and fits in well with building a community with a shared future for mankind.”

Strengthened alliances

For those observing closely, this vision for an alternative world order has been under way since Xi was handed the top job in China’s ruling Communist Party in late 2012.

At the centre of China’s efforts is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), founded in 2001 but significantly expanded under Xi. It comprises China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Pakistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as full member states; Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran and Mongolia as observer states; Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Turkey as “dialogue partners”. A process is under way to make Iran a full member, and Egypt, Qatar and Saudi Arabia dialogue partners. 

China has also set up competition with the Asia Development Bank in the shape of the Asia Infrastructure and Investment Bank, formed in 2016, which counts 106 countries as members. And the nation’s overarching Belt and Road Initiative, created under Xi in 2013 and designed to link East Asia and Europe through physical infrastructure, has in the past decade expanded to Africa, Oceania and Latin America. It has been a key tool for broadening China’s economic and political influence.

In terms of democracy, for the CCP and the People’s Republic of China, this has meant the Marxist-Leninist system of democratic dictatorship and democratic centralism, in which the CCP is the ultimate representative of the people. 

“This political system of ‘socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics’ is explicitly distinguished from Western liberal democracy, which is seen as incompatible with China’s unique conditions,” Katja Drinhausen explains in the China Media Project.

In its internal propaganda, the CCP regularly describes itself as democratic, with internal democracy determining who rises to the top of the organisation. This is true to some extent, but the CCP has about 90 million members, less than 7% of the population. Like all political parties, especially those that rule one-party states, the CCP is full of factions. Indeed Xi’s ascension to vice-president in 1997 over rival Li Keqiang, who would become his premier, was the result of a factional deal.

Russia and Ukraine

China was originally ambivalent, or at least closed-lipped, about the Russian invasion. After all, the war interferes with its economic supply chains and its investments in Ukraine (China receives 15.3% of Ukraine’s exports and provided 14.4% of its imports for the first two months of this year).

The conflict has also spiked global energy prices (China is dependent on energy imports), pushing up inflation across the world including in China’s sagging economy.

But since it dropped its almost three-year program of harsh COVID-related lockdowns and progressively began to reopen its borders at the end of last year, its position has become more obviously pro-Russian without actually and openly saying so. Multiple reports claim China is supplying Russia with arms, and in many ways Ukraine is the perfect test ground for a country such as China, which has not been involved in a “hot” war in decades.

But it’s not just Russia. Earlier this month, China brokered a deal to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia together — sidelining the US — which is arguably an even bigger deal as it pushes for more influence in the Middle East and its vital energy markets.

There are other bells and whistles too. Tomorrow, China’s answer to the annual World Economic Forum in Davos, the Boao Forum for Asia, commences in the eponymous town on its southern island province of Hainan. This year its theme is “building consensus in the post-pandemic era”.

Former Australian prime minister Bob Hawke was a long-time committee member of the event and Andrew Forrest’s Fortescue Metals has been a sponsor since its 2001 instigation. Along with regular attendance of leaders of authoritarian nations, China likes to have friendly faces from the West to help make these events more digestible. There are always plenty of Australian business folk in attendance and both Julia Gillard and Tony Abbott showed up when prime minister.

After recent hysterics in the Australian defence network and media mates about a potential Chinese Pacific war or invasion, it could be worth paying closer attention to China’s increasingly successful diplomacy among other authoritarian nations, wielding a version of democracy that suits them.

As a statement by China after Xi’s visit noted: “[The leaders] shared the view that this relationship has gone far beyond the bilateral scope and acquired critical importance for the global landscape and the future of humanity.”