Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing (Image: Sputnik Kremlin Pool via AP/Alexei Druzhinin)

China has quickly moved to develop a more nuanced approach to Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine after its initial firm backing of Vladimir Putin. On Tuesday, the Chinese government moved to play a key role in trying to halt the conflict. 

“Ukraine is willing to strengthen communications with China and looks forward to China playing a role in realising a ceasefire,” the Chinese government said in a statement.

This came days after Xi Jinping called Putin during a reported emergency meeting of the elite Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

According to Chinese state new agency Xinhua, Xi asked Putin to “abandon the Cold War mentality” and “form a balanced, effective and sustainable European security mechanism through negotiations”, adding that China had respect for “the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries” and abided by the UN Charter. China’s recognition of Ukraine’s sovereignty was later officially stated by State Councilor Wang Yi.

A change in tactic

One of the central tenets of China’s foreign policy is the sovereignty of other nations, as Kevin Rudd explained to The New York Times.

China’s “central attack on the United States as a global power since Xi Jinping has come to office has been to accuse it of continued violation of UN charter principles on national sovereignty”, Rudd said. “This torpedoes that argument midship.”

So realpolitik and party propaganda have created a perfect storm, and the CPP was caught in the floodwaters. 

So where is the very public Xi-Putin bromance heading? This personal relationship has been front and centre of state-media propaganda in both countries and is very much a part of Xi’s international statesman image. But the two countries are hardly close; they are more like allies with a common enemy in the US.

While Xi is highly unlikely to publicly step back from his relationship with Putin, China-watcher Bill Bishop predicted China’s shift in his Monday Sinocism newsletter, saying that Beijing will use a “neutrality” approach to look for an opportunity “to reap the benefits from trying to help to negotiate a settlement“. 

“We should expect the PRC to accelerate efforts to maintain the initiative in decoupling from the US and build strategic reserves in many areas as it doubles down on hardening everything inside the country and the system that it can,” Bishop wrote.

More immediate for Beijing is the economic conundrum of sanctions, led by the blockade on Russia’s Central Bank and the freezing of billions in personal assets of the country’s leaders. This is accelerating the collapse of the Russian ruble, making any trade lifelines that China offers to Moscow tenuous and possibly unsustainable.

Impact on China’s trade

China has a significant trading and investment relationship with Ukraine, a key part of the nation’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) — Beijing’s modern Silk Road project — designed to radically improve access to markets and suppliers via road rail and sea connections, as well as massive investments in hard and soft commodities in foreign countries.

In 2018, China opened a Belt and Road Trade and Investment Centre in Kyiv. In the first 11 months of 2021, bilateral trade in goods was worth US$17.36 billion, up 31.7% year on year. In September last year, a direct freight train from Ukraine to China began operations. COSCO Shipping delivers containers every week to Ukraine on two sea routes, and China has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in farmland in Ukraine, Europe’s second-largest country behind Russia. By 2019, Ukraine had become China’s largest corn supplier, providing over 80% of its imports.

Other countries China is targeting with the BRI — especially those in Africa and Southeast Asia — all voted for sanctions against Russia, with China abstaining rather than using its veto.

Also influencing Chinese policy will be the US-led technology ban on Russia. US President Joe Biden has vowed to halve high-tech exports to Russia, hobbling Moscow’s strategic ambitions. China’s burgeoning tech sector is the obvious replacement, leaving China with an invidious choice: join the embargo or face potentially severe secondary sanctions and lose major export markets in the West and beyond. This choice will be even more difficult for China, as the country is in the midst of a state-backed program to climb up the innovation ladder.

On Xi’s horizon is the politically fraught matter of the quinquennial leadership change in Beijing where Xi is expected to push for an unprecedented third term as top leader at the Communist Party’s Congress, usually held in October. 

The Russian situation — and its potential implications for Beijing’s long-term claim of sovereignty over Taiwan — has presented an unexpected and doubtlessly unwanted test of Xi’s internal support.

Taiwan’s future

At this stage, Xi looks untouchable, but things can change quickly in the opaque backrooms of the CCP — all of which brings us back to Taiwan.

If Putin’s can pull off his original plan for a swift capture of Ukraine and installation of a puppet government with limited resistance — along with relative compliance by the rest of the world — it will give Beijing a blueprint for annexing Taiwan. And perhaps it still will, although the prospect of long-term resistance in Ukraine is now more likely alongside continued economic sanctions on Russia.

But an extended conflict, with thousands of Russian soldiers returned in body bags to a population unconvinced about the conflict, would surely give Beijing pause for thought.

Still, if Xi does decide to move on Taiwan — which has joined the economic embargo on Russia and is sending humanitarian aid to Kyiv — Russian support will be essential. So we can expect continued “balancing” from Beijing.